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Municipal Airport-Establishment of Airport Jointly by Two Cities.-
[Arkansas] Taxpayer's suit to enjoin the city of Helena, Arkansas, from
issuing $16,000 in bonds toward the establishment of an airport jointly with
the city of West Helena-the latter city to participate to the extent of $4,500.
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained and the suit dismissed. From
this action the taxpayer took an appeal contending (1) that the constitution
does not authorize Helena to establish an airport jointly with a neighboring
city; (2) that a municipality cannot hold property jointly.
The applicable constitutional provision (Amendment No. 13) authorized
cities of the first and second class to issue bonds, after referendum, "for
the purchase, development and improvement of public parks and flying fields
located either within or without the corporate limits of such municipality."
In 1939, the legislature expressly granted authority to any two or more mu-
nicipalities "to own and hold in joint tenancy . . . lands for use as
airports or flying fields which may be located either within or without
their corporate limits; . . ."1 Held: The constitution was not violated
by providing for the development of an airport by two municipalities and,
further, nothing in the constitution prohibits two cities from owning property
as "tenants in common." 2
The result reached is beyond dispute; however, it may be noted that the
court failed to answer appellant's contentions directly. He contended cities
could not hold property jointly, viz., in joint tenancy. The controlling statute
only grants authority to hold airport property in "joint tenancy," yet the
court disposed of the contention by deciding that nothing in the constitution
prohibits two cities from holding property as "tenants in common."
The problem of the joint ownership and management of municipal prop-
erty has rarely been considered by the courts. There is authority for the
position that municipalities cannot hold property in joint tenancy.3 These
authorities are apparently not based upon constitutional infirmities, but upon
the legal impracticability of a municipal corporation being a joint tenant.
Joint tenancy is distinguished by the presence of the four unities (interest,
title, time and possession), and the element of survivorship. A municipal
corporation cannot fit the requirements of these four unities, and, due to its
perpetual life, eliminates survivorship. Municipalities may validly hold prop-
erty as tenants in common.4 It is quite possible that the court abbreviated
its opinion but, in effect, decided that a joint tenancy was impossible and
under the prevailing rule a tenancy in common should be evolved.
The joint establishment of an airport by two cities involves (a) financial
contributions and participation in a joint enterprise, and (b) municipal ac-
tivities outside the corporate limits (at least for one of the municipalities).
1. Ark. Acts 1939, Act 80, p. 168. Similar statutory provisions are: Mich.
Stats. Ann. (1937), Ch. 76, Sec. 10.66; Ill. Bar Stats. (1937), Ch. 24, Sec. 642j;
Wis. Stats. (1935) Sec. 114.151.
2. Ragsdale v. Hargraves, Mayor, Arkansas Supreme Court, decided June 19,
1939, Commerce Clearing House, Aviation Law Service, par. 1820.
3. DeWitt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 290 (1852) ; McQuillin Municipal Corpo-
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Some statutory and constitutional problems may be encountered. Because
of the unusual character of the municipal activity and since it involves ex-
territorial functions, express statutory authorization would be required.
Municipal functions generally are confined to express grants of authority.
This rule gains applicability when the city ventures outside of its territorial
limits. There are cases which have permitted the purchase and development
of real estate outside city limits without express statutory authority but
in furtherance of some necessary or legitimate municipal purpose, and, there-
fore, as a necessary implication thereof.5 However, the establishment of
an airport is the purpose in and of itself and furthers no other municipal
duty or activity. There are several courts that have validated the establish-
ment of airports outside corporate limits-in all instances, express statutory
authority covered the activity or a general statutory grant of authority was
extended to cover the establishment of an airport.1
Constitutional attack may be made on the ground that the contribution
of funds violates provisions contained in most state constitutions forbidding
the loaning of municipal credit or donating of funds in aid of any corpora-
tion or individual. In Ohio, this provision prevented a municipality from
participating in a joint enterprise with a private corporation. The constitution,
it was said, would and did "forbid the union of public and private capital
or credit."s But a contrary position was taken in Oregon. 9 However, these
cases are distinguishable so long as the airport is being fostered by two
public bodies, viz., municipalities. The constitutional provision is apparently
directed against financial cooperation between a private and a municipal
corporation.
Again, it might be urged that municipal funds are being expended for
a non-public purpose. If the project taken alone were in furtherance of a
public purpose, no reason appears to revise its designation because two rather
than one municipality are engaged. 10
The cooperation of two cities in the establishment of a joint airport
encourages the creation of more and better airports. What may be too great
an expenditure for, one municipality may not be for two. A joint airport
located in one of two cities may be accepted whereas a foreign airport regu-
lated by a neighboring city would not.
Many municipal functions lend themselves to joint establishment and
maintenance, e.g., bridges connecting two cities, ferries, water supply, sewage
disposal plants, irrigation, parks and sanitaria. One common way of exer-
5. Schneider v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94 (1903-power to own
stone quarry implied from power to improve streets) ; Somerville v. Waltham,
170 Mass. 160. 48 N. E. 1092 (1898) ; Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 140
I1. 216, 29 N. E. 704 (1892). Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. Portland, 119 Ore. 1,
247 Pac. 319 (1926-Sewer outlet); McQuillin, supra, Sec. 1210 and Sec. 1969.
6. Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928) ; State ex rel Hile v.
Cleveland, 26 Ohio 265, 160 N. E. 241 (1927); Silverman v. Chattanooga, 165
Tenn. 642, 57 S. W. (2d) 552 (1933). Ebrite v. Crawford, 215 Cal. 724, 12 P.(2d) 937 (1932). See notes 4 JOURNAL OF Ant LAW 437, 3 JOURNAL OF AiR LAW
462.
7. City of Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 Pac. 258 (1930) ; State
v. Clausen, 157 Wash. 451, 289 Pac. 61 (1930)-power to establish airport out-
side limits implied from power to acquire property by eminent domain outside
corporate limits).
8. Alter v. City of Cincinnati, 56 Ohio St. 47, 46 N. E. 69 (1897) ; Village
of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 190 N. E. 766 (1934).
9. Municipal Security Co. v. Baker County, 39 Ore. 396, 65 Pac. 369 (1901).
10. Reinhart v. Mac Guffie. Pa. Ct. of Com. Pleas. of ............ decided
May, 1933, Commerce Clearing House Aviation Law Service, par. 1511 (question
whether county could join with city in development of airport) Cf. Hunnicutt v.
Atlanta, 104 Ga. (1898-Attempt by city to acquire county courthouse by first
purchasing a 1/5 interest invalidated on ground that acquisition of 1/5 interest
was for profit and not for corporate purposes).
NOTES, COMMENTS AND DIGESTS
cising local functions which spread beyond the boundaries of a single mu-
nicipality is to create a separate municipal district to perform that one func-
tion-irrigation districts, park districts, sanitary districts are examples. So,
too, an airport district could be created." The disadvantage is that addi-
tional governmental agencies are established in the same territory, with added
administrators, expenses and taxes.
LEE A. FREEMAN.*
DIGESTS
Airport-Public Nuisance.-[California] Action by city attorney of
Los Angeles to abate a public nuisance-an airport operated in the residential
section of the city. The airport had been established fifteen years ago and
prior to the development of the surrounding area. It was used for sight-
seeing trips and student instruction.
The evidence demonstrated that in the present operation of the airport:
(a) great quantities of dust were stirred up and blown into the sur-
rounding residential area, due to prevailing winds;(b) planes approached from an easterly direction over the residential
area and, in landing, descended to such low altitudes as to be a menace to the
residents;
(c) many shore flights were taken daily, and oil was occasionally dropped
on the homes of residents and surrounding premises;
(d) motors were gunned causing loud and sudden noises;
(e) automobile traffic congestion was caused.
Held: The airport involved was not an important one and was not prop-
erly erected, operated and equipped. As operated, it was a public nuisance.
Furthermore, the owners or operators would not and could not gain prescrip-
tive rights to maintain such a nuisance from prior or long use. Injunction
was granted to restrain such operations as had disturbed or annoyed the
occupants of the residential area. People of State of California v. Dycer
Flying Service, Inc., California Superior Court, City of 'Los Angeles, decided
March 31, 1939. Commerce Clearing House Aviation Law Service, par. 1818.
L. A. F.
Conflict of Laws-Workmen's Compensation-State in Which Con-
tract Was Executed vs'. State of Employment and Injury.-[Washington]
An employee of Northwest Airlines, Inc., in the course of his employment
in the State of Washington was killed. While he had resided and worked
in Washington, his contract of employment was executed in Minnesota. The
defendant air line claimed the laws of Minnesota rather than the laws of
Washington controlled. The court, however, denied this contention and
pointed out:(a) that the Washington Compensation Act provides for a mandatory
and exclusive form of relief and establishes a broad and comprehensive public
policy;
(b) that to give effect to the Minnesota statute would be to repudiate
the clear policy and provisions of the Washington Act; would deny the cer-
tain and sure relief provided;
(c) that it is no greater hardship for a foreign employer to comply with
the compensation acts of the various states than fof the State of Washington
to enforce the obligations imposed by foreign jurisdictions. Livermore Adm'x
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Washington Superior Court, County of Spokane,
decided March 1, 1939, Commerce Clearing House Aviation Law Service,
par. 913.
L. A. F.
Insurance-Interpretatiori of Participation in Aviation or Aeronautics
With Relation to Airplane Passengers.-[Federal] Decedent, a fare-pay-
ing passenger on a Transcontinental and Western Air Lines plane to Pitts-
150.
* Of the Chicago Bar.
11. California Airport District Act, General Laws of California (1937) Act
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burgh, was killed in a crash. His insurance policy exempted death "as a
result of participation in aviation, aeronautics or subaquatics."
Held: The exemption clause does not apply to passengers. A forceful
statement of the raison d'etre of the decision (and recent cases in conformity
therewith) is worth quoting:
"We think that the later cases reflect a changing attitude toward
aviation, due no doubt to the marvelous progress made in the art of
flying. In the early days each flight was a venture. The pilot and pas-
senger, if he had one, flew tandem, or side by side, in an open cockpit
over unknown terrain, to make-shift landing fields. Today transport
flying is, a business. The air lines have modern landing fields and pas-
senger stations, and their established scheduled routes are protected by
radio beams, beacons, weather reports, etc. They compete with each
other for patronage, and people in increasing numbers are using their serv-
ices as a matter of course. Their passengers no more participate in the
operation of their planes than do passengers upon a railroad train par-
ticipate in operating the train or those upon an ocean liner participate
in navigating the ship. They pay their fares and passively accept the
services and accommodations offered. The pilot is employed because of
his skill and efficiency. The passenger is not permitted to! direct or con-
trol him as to how, where or when he shall fly. Any sensible passenger
would not presume to do so. If it was ever true, it cannot now be said
that a fare-paying passenger on a commercial air liner 'participates in
aviation or aeronautics.' Words, after all, are but labels whose content
and meaning are continually shifting with the times."
The Massachusetts Protective Association, Inc. v. Bayersdorfer, U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, decided June 28, 1939, Commerce
Clearing House, Aviation Law Service, par. 530.
L. A. F.
Transcontinental Airline-What Constitutes "Doing Business" by a
Foreign Corporation for the Purpose of Service of Process.-[Federal]
The plaintiff, a resident and citizen of New York, brought this suit in the
Federal District Court against the defendant, a Delaware Corporation, for
the alleged wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate, a resident and citizen
of New York, arising out of an airplane accident in Ohio while the plaintiff's
intestate was a passenger on one of defendant's planes on a regular flight.
The defendant moved to vacate and set aside the service of process and to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that it was not doing business in
New York, (2) that it was not properly served, and (3) that for the court
to entertain the suit would constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce and a denial of due process. The defendant's principal place of
business was in Chicago, but it had a ticket office and passenger station and
waiting room in New York City, at which it received information as to
weather conditions and regularity of flights, and conveyed such infornation
to passengers, and from which office its passengers were transported to its
Newark, N. J., airport by an independent bus concern, but whose busses
while in such engagements bore the defendant's name. The defendant's regu-
lar eastern airport was at Newark, N. J., but it maintained two alternative
landing fields in New York. It maintained a bank account in New York City
for the temporary deposit of receipts and for the payment of expenses incident
to its New York office. Other than as stated, the defendant's agents in New
York City had no authority to and did not make contracts for the defendant
in New York or otherwise represent it there. It evidently advertised New
York City as the eastern terminus of its line.
Held: Motion denied. The defendant is engaged in business in New
York; service of process on its "District Traffic Manager," in charge of its
New York City office, is proper service of process on it; and the maintenance
of the suit and trial of the action in New York will not unduly burden inter-
state commerce and does not constitute a denial of due process. See Comment
10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERcE 430.
Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York-Decided June 6, 1939-
C.C.H. Aviation Law Service, par. 3059. C. G. B., JR.
